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The ‘default network’ is defined as a set of areas, encompassing posterior-cingulate/precuneus, anterior cingulate/mesiofrontal
cortex and temporo-parietal junctions, that show more activity at rest than during attention-demanding tasks. Recent studies
have shown that it is possible to reliably identify this network in the absence of any task, by resting state functional magnetic
resonance imaging connectivity analyses in healthy volunteers. However, the functional significance of these spontaneous brain
activity fluctuations remains unclear. The aim of this study was to test if the integrity of this resting-state connectivity pattern in
the default network would differ in different pathological alterations of consciousness. Fourteen non-communicative
brain-damaged patients and 14 healthy controls participated in the study. Connectivity was investigated using probabilistic
independent component analysis, and an automated template-matching component selection approach. Connectivity in all
default network areas was found to be negatively correlated with the degree of clinical consciousness impairment, ranging
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from healthy controls and locked-in syndrome to minimally conscious, vegetative then coma patients. Furthermore, precuneus
connectivity was found to be significantly stronger in minimally conscious patients as compared with unconscious patients.
Locked-in syndrome patient’s default network connectivity was not significantly different from controls. Our results show that
default network connectivity is decreased in severely brain-damaged patients, in proportion to their degree of consciousness
impairment. Future prospective studies in a larger patient population are needed in order to evaluate the prognostic value of the
presented methodology.
Keywords: Default mode; fMRI; coma; vegetative state; minimally conscious state
Abbreviations: CRS-R = Coma Recovery Scale-Revised; DMN = default mode network; fMRI = functional magnetic resonance
imaging; PCC = posterior cingulate cortex
Introduction
In recent years, advances in emergency medicine and reanimation
have considerably increased the number of patients surviving
prolonged cardiac arrest or severe motor vehicle accidents
(Laureys and Boly, 2008). An important proportion of these
surviving patients are left with severe brain damage, leading to
the presence of disorders of consciousness. Among disorders of
consciousness, coma is defined by ‘unarousable unresponsiveness’;
and ‘vegetative state’ by preserved behavioural sleep–wake cycles
and reflexive but not purposeful behaviours (Laureys and Boly,
2007). Minimally conscious patients, though unable to communi-
cate, show inconsistent non-reflexive behaviours, interpreted as
signs of awareness of self or environment (Giacino et al., 2002).
The locked-in syndrome describes patients who are awake and
conscious but have no means of producing speech, limb or facial
movements (American Congress of Rehabilitation Medicine,
1995). A particular problem in patients with disorders of con-
sciousness is that the clinical diagnosis is very challenging at the
bedside, and several studies have reported high rates of misdiag-
nosis, reaching up to 40% (Majerus et al., 2005; Schnakers et al.,
2009). It is now increasingly recognized that diagnosing these
distinct conditions correctly is critical, both for ethical reasons
and in order to improve the clinical management of these patients.
Indeed, several studies have shown that brain activation in
response to auditory or painful stimuli is very limited when in a
vegetative state, while this activation is virtually normal in patients
who are minimally conscious (Boly et al., 2004, 2008a), suggest-
ing the possibility of residual external stimuli perception in the
latter patient population. Furthermore, preliminary data show
that patients in the minimally conscious state have a much
better functional prognosis than patients in a vegetative state,
independently of the aetiology (Giacino, 2005). These concerns
raise the need for reliable paraclinical markers as a complement
to the clinical assessment in differentiating patients in a vegetative
state from patients in a minimally conscious state.
Over the last 8 years, increasing attention has been paid to the
study of spontaneous brain activity and its significance for cogni-
tion and behaviour (Raichle, 2006). In particular, the concept of a
‘default mode network (DMN) of brain function’ was introduced
by Raichle et al. (2001), after observing that a number of areas
including the precuneus, bilateral temporo-parietal junctions and
medial prefrontal cortex, were more active at rest than when the
subjects were involved in an attention-demanding cognitive task.
This network of areas, now commonly referred to as the ‘DMN’,
has been replicably implicated in cognitive processes like ‘day-
dreaming’ or ‘mind-wandering’, stimulus-independent thoughts
or self-related thoughts (Laureys et al., 2007; Mason et al.,
2007; Buckner et al., 2008). Though the functional significance
of the DMN remains a matter of debate, it has been suggested as
a candidate for the network subserving basic functions related to
consciousness (Boly et al., 2008b; Greicius et al., 2008). Studying
this network in patients with disorders of consciousness is, at first
glance, a very challenging undertaking, due to the highly subjec-
tive and complex cognitive functions reported to be supported by
this network.
Several studies in healthy volunteers have shown the ability of
resting state functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to
identify structured patterns of functional connectivity among
defined neuroanatomical systems reliably, including the DMN
(Cavanna and Trimble, 2006; Damoiseaux et al., 2006;
Cavanna, 2007; Shehzad et al., 2009). Of potentially major inter-
est from the clinical point of view, is the fact that resting state
fMRI connectivity studies allow the investigation of higher
order cognitive networks like the DMN, without requiring the
patients’ collaboration. This fact is particularly important in
non-communicative patients such as those with disorders of
consciousness. Resting state fMRI acquisitions are also very easy
to perform compared with standard task-based fMRI paradigms,
and could thus have a potentially broader and faster translation
into clinical practice. However, to date, the functional significance
of resting state connectivity patterns remain unclear. Some authors
have even questioned the value and interpretability of spontane-
ous brain activity fluctuations as recorded by fMRI (Morcom and
Fletcher, 2007).
The aim of this study was to investigate DMN resting state fMRI
connectivity in a cohort of patients with disorders of consciousness
including coma, vegetative state, minimally conscious state and
locked-in syndrome. We hypothesized that DMN connectivity
strength would be related to the level of consciousness of
non-communicative brain-damaged patients, as assessed by
standardized behavioural scales. Furthermore, we expected a
particularly strong link between the level of consciousness and
connectivity in the precuneus, reported to be a central node in
the DMN (Fransson and Marrelec, 2008), and potentially the most
connected area in the brain (Hagmann et al., 2008).
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Methods
Patients
We compared 14 brain-injured patients (1 locked-in syndrome, 4 min-
imally conscious, 4 vegetative state and 5 coma patients, age range
25–77 years) to 14 age-matched healthy volunteers (age range 28–57
years). In patients, clinical examination was repeatedly performed
using standardized scales [the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R)
(Giacino et al., 2004); and the Glasgow Liege scale (Born, 1988)]
on the day of scanning, and in the week before and the week after.
Table 1 reports demographic and clinical characteristics of the patients.
Patients were scanned in an unsedated condition. The study was
approved by the Ethics Committee of the Medical School of the
University of Lie`ge. Informed consent to participate to the study was
obtained from the subjects themselves in the case of healthy subjects,
and from the legal surrogate of the patients.
Data acquisition and analysis
In all subjects, 10 min resting state fMRI were acquired on a 1.5 T
magnetic resonance scanner (Siemens, Germany). Two hundred
multislice T2
-weighted fMRI images were obtained with a gradient
echo-planar sequence using axial slice orientation (36 slices; voxel
size: 3.753.753.6 mm3; matrix size 646436; repetition
time = 3000 ms; echo time = 30 ms; flip angle = 90; field of
view = 240 mm). Head movements were minimized using customized
cushions. A T1 magnetization prepared rapid gradient echo sequence
was also acquired in the same session for coregistration with functional
data. Monitoring of vital parameters (electrocardiogram, blood pressure,
pulse oxymetry, end tidal carbon dioxide partial pressure and respiratory
rate) was performed in patients by a senior anaesthesiologist throughout
the experiment.
Data analysis was performed using Statistical Parametric Mapping-5
(www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) and probabilistic independent component
analysis (Beckmann and Smith, 2004) as implemented in MELODIC,
part of the Functional MRI of the Brain software library (FSL)
(www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl). Independent component analysis is a
statistical technique that separates a set of signals into independent
(uncorrelated and non-Gaussian) spatio-temporal components
(Beckmann and Smith, 2004). When applied to the T2
 signal of
fMRI, independent component analysis allows not only for the
removal of artefacts (McKeown et al., 1998; Quigley et al., 2002),
but also for the isolation of task-activated neural networks (McKeown
et al., 1998; Calhoun et al., 2002), or of low-frequency neural
networks during task-free or cognitively undemanding fMRI scans
(Greicius et al., 2004; Beckmann et al., 2005; Seeley et al., 2007).
In a first step, functional images were re-aligned, normalized and
smoothed (4 mm full width at half maximum Gaussian kernel) using
Statistical Parametric Mapping-5. Independent component analysis
was then performed separately for each individual scanning session
(one single session was acquired per subject), after removal of
low-frequency drifts (150 s high-pass filter). We allowed FSL to use
a probabilistic estimation of the number of components as
implemented in the probabilistic independent component analysis
MELODIC framework (Beckman et al., 2005; Beckman and Smith,
2005) aiming to identify the number of non-Gaussian sources in the
data (and thus the optimal number of components needed to decom-
pose the data), and attempting to avoid under- or over-fitting due to
an incorrect number of sources. The best-fit component for each sub-
ject was then selected in an automated three-step process described as
the ‘goodness-of-fit’ approach (Greicius et al., 2004, 2008; Seeley
et al., 2007). This method allows for the unbiased selection of the
component for each subject that best corresponds to the DMN. The
template used in the present analysis for component selection
was obtained from an independent dataset encompassing 19 healthy
volunteers (age range 21–31 years) studied on another 3 T MRI
scanner (see Supplementary Material for methodological details).
First, because intrinsic connectivity is detected in the very
low-frequency range (Cordes et al., 2001), a frequency filter was
applied to remove any components in which high-frequency signal
(40.1 Hz) constituted 50% or more of the power in the Fourier spec-
trum. Next, we obtained goodness-of-fit scores to the DMN template
for the remaining low-frequency components of each subject. To do
this, the template-matching procedure calculated the average Z-score
of voxels falling within the chosen template minus the average Z-score
of voxels outside the template and selected the component in which
this difference (the goodness-of-fit) is the greatest. Z-scores here
reflect the degree to which the time series of a given voxel correlates
with the time series corresponding to the specific independent com-
ponent analysis component, scaled by the standard deviation of the
error term. The Z-score is therefore a measure of how many standard
deviations the signal is from the background noise. Finally, the
component with the highest goodness-of-fit score was selected as
the ‘best-fit’ component and used in the subsequent group analysis.
This template-matching procedure was performed separately for each
subject. It is important to note that this approach does not alter the
components to fit the template in any way, but merely scores the
pre-estimated components on how well they match the template
(Seeley et al., 2007).
Next, all group analyses were performed on the subjects’ best-fit
component Z-score images. We used a random-effects model,
estimating the error variance across subjects (Holmes and Friston,
1998), consisting of an ANOVA with the four different states of
consciousness (controls, minimally conscious state, vegetative state
and coma patients) as the between subjects factor. A correction for
non-sphericity was applied to account for potentially unequal variance
across groups. A first analysis aimed at identifying the DMN in the
control population. A second analysis searched for linear:
y ¼ x 1
4
X3
i¼0 ið Þ x ¼ 0,:::,3
 
non-linear (exponential):







y ¼ xþ 1ð Þ1 1
4
X3
i¼0 iþ 1ð Þ
1
 
correlations between DMN connectivity and the level of conscious-
ness (i.e. controls, minimally conscious state, vegetative state and
coma). A third analysis looked for differences in DMN connectivity
between minimally conscious state and unconscious (vegetative state
and coma) patients, using a conjunction approach. A fourth analysis
searched for a correlation between DMN connectivity and summed
CRS-R scores. A supplementary multiple regression random effects
analysis compared the single locked-in syndrome patient to other
patient populations. In all our group level analyses, the subjects’
age was added as a confounding factor. Results in controls were
thresholded at P50.05 corrected for false discovery rate at the
whole brain level. All other analyses were thresholded at P50.05
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corrected for false discovery rate in a 10 mm radius spherical small
volume centred on a priori coordinates (all peak voxels from an
independent DMN connectivity analysis in healthy controls previously
published in Boly et al., 2009).
Finally, we computed the power spectrum of the time course of
each DMN component and compared obtained peak frequencies
(i.e. the frequency with maximum power). Two-tailed permutation
tests (Nichols and Holmes, 2002) looked for group differences using
EEGLAB (Delorme and Makeig, 2004) implemented in MATLAB 7
(Mathworks, Natick, MA, USA) and results were thresholded for
significance at P50.05.
Results
In controls, the DMN could be reproducibly identified as a set of
areas encompassing posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) /precuneus,
temporo-parietal junction, medial prefrontal cortex, para-
hippocampal gyri, superior frontal sulci and thalamus (Fig. 1 and
Table 2). The assessed non-linear functions showed a significant
correlation between DMN connectivity strength and the level of
consciousness in all the previously mentioned areas. Quasi
identical results were obtained when exponential or power law
contrasts were employed, whereas a less good fit was observed
for the linear correlation, though linear correlation between con-
nectivity and consciousness was significant (Table 3 and Fig. 2
show results for the exponential correlation). Clinical experience
indicates that the decrease in consciousness between normal
wakefulness, minimally conscious, vegetative state and coma is
indeed non-linear (vegetative state patients’ consciousness being
closer to comatose patients’ consciousness than to minimal
consciousness). In all analyses, the peak area of significance for
the correlation between connectivity and consciousness was
found to be the PCC/precuneus. PCC/precuneus connectivity
was also found to differentiate minimally conscious from uncon-
scious patients (Table 4, Fig. 3). No brain area was found to be
more present in DMN connectivity maps in unconscious
compared with minimally conscious patients. No brain area
could be identified as presenting a weaker connectivity in the
single locked-in syndrome patient compared with controls. For
illustrative purposes, the locked-in syndrome patient’s data are
displayed as red circles in Fig. 2, allowing comparison to controls’
and patients’ data.
Table 2 Peak voxels of the default network identified in healthy volunteers
Areas x y z Z-value P-value
Posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus 8 52 28 6.82 50.001
Medial prefrontal cortex 8 52 32 5.53 50.001
Superior frontal sulcus R 28 24 40 5.22 50.001
L 20 36 48 6.05 50.001
Temporo-parietal junction R 52 56 24 5.41 50.001
L 48 56 20 5.92 50.001
Parahippocampal gyrus L 28 32 20 4.95 50.001
Temporal cortex R 64 8 24 5.44 50.001
L 60 12 24 4.82 50.001
Inferior frontal gyrus R 40 24 20 4.04 0.001
Post-central gyrus L 52 16 44 3.59 0.002
Insula L 32 16 8 3.00 0.013
Thalamus 8 8 0 2.73 0.025
Brainstem 0 20 24 2.71 0.026
Cerebellum R 12 44 40 3.55 0.003
L 28 80 36 4.75 50.001
P-values are corrected for false discovery rate at the whole brain level.
Figure 1 Default network identified in controls. Results are thresholded for display at whole brain false discovery rate corrected
P50.01 and rendered on the mean T1 structural image of the controls.
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We observed a correlation between connectivity and CRS-R
total scores in most of the DMN (Table 5), but results only
survived correction for multiple comparisons in the medial prefrontal
gyrus.
The total number of components and the proportion of variance
explained by the DMN component were not significantly different
in patients as compared with healthy controls [33 20 (range
11–68) versus 27 4 (range 21–35) components; and 4.1 2.3
(range 1.2–8.7) versus 3.6 0.8 (range 2.6–5.7), respectively].
Finally, the power spectrum of the DMN time courses showed
a non-significant increase in peak frequency in patients as
compared with healthy volunteers (mean SD, 0.040 0.037
range 0.001–0.100 Hz versus 0.020 0.013 range 0.001–
0.056 Hz, respectively).
Figure 2 Default network connectivity correlates with the level of consciousness, ranging from healthy controls, to minimally
conscious, vegetative then comatose patients. (A) Areas showing a linear correlation between default network connectivity and
consciousness. Results are thresholded for display at uncorrected P50.05 and rendered on the mean T1 structural image of the
patients. (B) Mean Z-scores and 90% confidence interval for default network connectivity in PCC/precuneus, temporo-parietal
junction, medial prefrontal cortex and parahippocampal gyrus across patient populations. Locked-in syndrome patient Z-scores are
displayed for illustrative purposes as an additional red circles overlaid on control population data.
Table 3 Peak voxels showing an exponential correlation between default network connectivity and the level of
consciousness
Areas x y z Z-value P-value
Posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus 8 52 28 4.89 0.004
Medial prefrontal cortex 0 52 20 3.52 0.025
Superior frontal sulcus R 8 52 35 4.62 0.005
L 20 36 48 4.66 0.004
Temporo-parietal junction R 60 64 24 3.56 0.025
L 48 68 24 4.10 0.009
Parahippocampal gyrus L 32 20 24 3.83 0.014
Temporal cortex R 56 12 24 4.29 0.007
L 48 56 20 4.26 0.007
Precentral gyrus L 48 20 52 3.83 0.014
Postcentral gyrus L 52 16 44 3.35 0.033
Thalamus 24 24 12 4.17 0.008
8 12 12 3.32 0.034
Brainstem 4 24 36 3.31 0.035
Cerebellum R 12 44 40 3.90 0.012
L 28 80 36 3.46 0.028
P-values are corrected for false discovery rate for whole brain.
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Discussion
Clinical and neuroscientific relevance
of a correlation between DMN
connectivity and the level of
consciousness
Using resting state fMRI connectivity analyses, we showed an
exponential correlation between DMN connectivity integrity and
the level of consciousness of brain-damaged patients ranging from
controls, to minimally conscious, vegetative state then coma
patients. These results suggest that, although the DMN can still
be identified in unconscious patients, as in anaesthetized monkeys
(Vincent et al., 2007), connectivity strength within DMN could
possibly be a reliable indicator of a patient’s level of consciousness,
differentiating unconscious patients such as those in a coma or
vegetative state from minimally conscious and locked-in syndrome
patients. As resting state fMRI studies are much easier to acquire
in a routine clinical setting than standard fMRI paradigms, these
Table 4 Default network areas differentiating minimally conscious from unconscious (vegetative and coma) patients
(conjunction approach)
Areas x y z Z-value P-value
Minimally conscious state`unconscious
Posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus 20 48 32 3.62 0.012
Medial prefrontal cortex 4 52 24 1.81 0.035
Temporo-parietal junction R 64 52 24 2.35 0.010
Parahippocampal cortex L 32 20 24 2.11 0.017
Temporal cortex R 60 56 28 2.35 0.010
Thalamus 24 28 12 1.75 0.040
Brainstem 12 16 16 1.70 0.045
Minimally conscious state_unconscious
No areas could be identified
P-values are corrected for false discovery rate in a 10 mm radius spherical small volume centred on a priori coordinates. Non-corrected P-values.
Table 5 Peak voxels showing a correlation between default network connectivity and the CRS-R total score
Areas x y z Z-value P-value
Posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus 8 32 40 2.34 0.010
Medial frontal gyrus 4 48 36 3.78 0.006
Superior frontal sulcus R 16 32 40 1.70 0.044
Parahippocampal cortex L 40 4 24 1.86 0.032
Temporo-parietal junction R 44 68 48 1.89 0.030
L 40 64 52 2.07 0.019
Temporal cortex R 60 0 40 2.36 0.009
L 60 8 28 1.99 0.023
Thalamus 16 36 8 2.10 0.018
Brainstem 4 28 48 2.30 0.011
P-values are corrected for false discovery rate in a 10 mm radius spherical small volume centred on a priori coordinates. Non-corrected P-values.
Figure 3 Brain areas within the default network connectivity which differentiate minimally conscious patients from unconscious
patients. Results are thresholded for display at uncorrected P50.05 and rendered on the mean T1 structural image of the patients.
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connectivity studies could potentially be a useful complement to
bedside behavioural assessment in the evaluation of the level of
consciousness of non-communicative brain-damaged patients.
Note that CRS-R total scores showed a less significant fit as
compared with the non-linear correlation with DMN connectivity.
In our view, this is explained by the fact that the CRS-R total score
was not developed to differentiate between different levels of
consciousness (e.g. a minimally conscious patient may have an
identical CRS-R total score as a vegetative state patient).
In addition to its potential clinical relevance, the finding that
DMN connectivity strength is proportional to the level of
consciousness of brain-damaged patients sheds light on the
significance of spontaneous brain activity fluctuations as recorded
by fMRI. Our results suggest that the strength of connectivity
in resting state fMRI-identified networks could be related in
a quantitative manner to the level of conscious processing in
severely brain-damaged patients. These results complement pre-
vious findings showing partially preserved connectivity in states of
altered consciousness like vegetative state (Boly et al., 2009),
light sleep (Horovitz et al., 2008) or anaesthetized monkey
(Vincent et al., 2007). Our results are also in line with recent
reports of decreased DMN connectivity in healthy volunteers
during sedation (Greicius et al., 2008) and deep sleep (Horovitz
et al., 2009). Larson-Prior et al. (2009), however, observed no
measurable change in DMN connectivity during light sleep. Taken
together, these findings suggest a two-layer view of resting state
fMRI DMN connectivity: one part of the DMN connectivity
would persist independently of the level of consciousness, and
possibly related to underlying anatomical connectivity (Vincent
et al., 2007; Greicius et al., 2009), and the other part being
more tightly related to the presence of conscious cognitive
processes. More generally, the finding of decreased DMN
connectivity in proportion to impairment of consciousness is con-
sistent with previous findings of metabolic impairment of a large
frontoparietal network, encompassing main nodes of the DMN,
in patients in vegetative state compared with controls, as well as
in other states of clinical unconsciousness such as sleep, anaes-
thesia, seizures or somnambulism (Baars et al., 2003; Laureys,
2005). The current results are also consistent with the so-called
‘global workspace’ theory of consciousness (Baars et al., 2003;
Dehaene and Changeux, 2005), by suggesting that higher order
frontoparietal areas are likely to play a crucial role in the genesis
of conscious perception. However, we should remain cautious
when interpreting the functional significance of DMN connectiv-
ity measurements in terms of consciousness. More investigations
on physiological (e.g. sleep and hypnotic state), pharmacological
(e.g. general anaesthesia) and pathological alterations of con-
sciousness in health and disease subjects, are awaited before a
consensus can be reached on the precise functional meaning
of this network.
The maximum peak of significance for a correlation between
DMN connectivity and consciousness was found in the PCC/
precuneus. This finding is coherent with studies showing a central
role of precuneus in DMN architecture, from the functional
(Fransson and Marrelec, 2008) to the structural point of view
(Hagmann et al., 2008). Precuneus connectivity could also reliably
differentiate minimally conscious from unconscious patients, again
suggesting a particularly strong relationship between the level of
activity of this area and the patients’ level of consciousness
(Laureys et al., 2004; Cavanna and Trimble, 2006). As the DMN
has been suggested to be involved in ‘mind-wandering’ (Mason
et al., 2007) and self-referential processes (Cavanna and
Trimble, 2006; Cavanna, 2007), our results could also imply that
minimally conscious patients have a partially preserved level of
self-awareness or ‘day-dreaming’-like cognition or, at a minimum,
have the residual functional architecture to support such complex
processes. This finding stresses the importance of assessing resid-
ual cognitive functions in patients with disorders of consciousness,
which could be largely underestimated at the clinical bedside.
It should be noted that while the thalamus has not been
reported in all DMN connectivity studies in the literature, it has
been described in papers on healthy volunteers in recent years
(Fransson, 2005; De Luca et al., 2006; Greicius et al., 2007;
Boly et al., 2009). Thalamo-cortical loops have been increasingly
associated with conscious perception (Laureys et al., 2000; White
and Alkire, 2003; Schiff et al., 2007), possibly explaining our
observed correlation between consciousness and thalamo-cortical
DMN connectivity.
Technical issues in the study of resting
state fMRI connectivity in severely
brain-damaged patients
Several technical issues should be discussed in the study of
connectivity in patients with altered states of consciousness.
While the acquisition of resting state fMRI data is easier than
standard fMRI paradigms, spontaneous blood oxygen level depen-
dent fluctuations measures are subject to more artefactual bias
than evoked data (Morcom and Fletcher, 2007). Therefore, resting
state fMRI analyses should include a method for carefully separat-
ing relevant signal from artefacts present in the data. Independent
component analysis is especially suited to this aim. Compared with
region of interest-driven correlation analyses, independent compo-
nent analysis offers the double advantage of being able to isolate
cortical connectivity maps from non-neural signals (Beckmann
et al., 2005; Beckman and Smith, 2005; Seeley et al., 2007),
and of being unbiased by the selection of a seed region-of-interest
for correlation analysis. Therefore, independent component analy-
sis may allow the identification of network nodes missed by the
conventional region of interest-driven analysis (Seeley et al.,
2007). The selection of relevant components of interest is still an
issue when dealing with the outputs of independent component
analysis. In a clinical framework, the use of an automated
component selection approach, as used in the present analysis, is
ideally required, in order to avoid subjective bias in the interpre-
tation of data. In this study, the template used for automatic DMN
component selection was issued from an independent connectivity
study on a separate group of healthy volunteers, and was applied
to both controls and patients. It should be noted that this
methodology, classically employed in clinical studies on DMN con-
nectivity [e.g. in dementia (Greicius et al., 2004), depression
(Greicius et al., 2007) or epileptic patients (Zhang et al., 2009)],
might bias the selection towards the healthy control group. Future
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work should compare the presently used ‘goodness-of-fit’
approach to other component selection approaches based on
spatial similarity with templates, or ‘fingerprinting’ approaches
[i.e. graphical representations of independent components in
multidimensional space encompassing spatial and temporal
entropy, kurtosis, one-lag auto-correlation and power contribu-
tions in different frequency bands (De Martino et al., 2007)] in
order to test for reliability at the individual level. Another remain-
ing question is the relationship between structural and functional
connectivity changes in non-communicative brain-damaged
patients. Functional connectivity in DMN has indeed been related
to underlying structural anatomy (Greicius et al., 2009). Further
multimodal studies should combine resting state functional MRI
data with structural MRI (e.g. diffusion tensor imaging data) or
high-density EEG recordings.
Conclusion
We here identified a significant correlation, at the group-level,
between DMN connectivity and the level of consciousness.
These results suggest that after further validation, the present
methodology could potentially be rapidly translated into a routine
clinical setting and bring relevant ancillary information on a
patient’s residual brain function to bear on their clinical evaluation.
The presence of an exponential correlation between DMN
connectivity and consciousness suggests that resting state fMRI
could be a potentially useful paraclinical marker of the level of
consciousness in non-communicative brain-damaged patients,
complementing their bedside assessment. Future studies on
larger samples of patients will aim at correlating resting state
fMRI connectivity with prognosis and white matter damage
(as assessed, for example, by diffusion tensor imaging) in individ-
ual brain-damaged patients.
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